The Convening Authority as an Early Appellate Authority

At the heart of the early American court-martial was the convening authority, the military commander with the legal authority to convene such a proceeding.[1] The Army and Navy of the period was not only quite small relative to today, they also existed in a world with limited communications bandwidth. Generals, Admirals, and (Navy) Captains received their general orders from the Commander-in-Chief and were delegated vast authority to otherwise act on their own pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief’s “intent.”

Courts-martial of the period were primarily the (sole) medium to imposing punishment and maintaining control over enlisted[2] men.[3] This is an important point to understand. A criminal proceeding in a regularly constituted court of competent jurisdiction is, at least in theory, intended to independently assess the facts of a case to determine whether the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and, if necessary, impose an appropriate sentence. Courts-martial by this period had a long history of being a creature of necessity outside regular law used to enforce conformity and discipline in an age before loyalty to a state, much less a constitution, while attenuating charges of arbitrary and capricious whims (which would not be the acts of an officer and a gentleman).

Under the conventional perception of courts-martial of this era, a panel of military officers heard the evidence and independently determined guilt. Likewise, this same panel independently determined the appropriate sentence. Courts-martial of the period had no maximum punishment tables nor sentencing guidelines. Sentences were determined, paraphrasing, “as a court-martial may direct.”

So, one would be fine to think the convening authority acted as an appellate authority over the independent determination of the court-martial panel.

The convening authority selected the panel of officers to determine guilt and adjudge a sentence. He also selected the prosecutor, who also spoke for the Accused. If the convening authority disagreed with a particular ruling by the panel, he could re-submit the issue for further review. Same goes for the sentence.

Oh, and he also rated each of the officers selected for the panel, meaning he was in control of their career.

As a further indication of a court-martial’s administrative hearing character, though there were no early rules of evidence or procedure, the early Articles specifically spelled out that the trial judge advocate was responsible for compiling the record of trial and forwarding it to the convening authority. He then had the authority to approve the findings and sentence, set them aside, or approve a lower sentence.

An additional copy was forwarded to the JAG Department in Washington, DC. At the time, the department had no authority to do anything to the approved findings and sentence. The most it could do was, upon review, provide recommendations to the convening authority to consider in the future. In fact, it was not until Brigadier General Samuel Ansell in the early 20th century that the JAG Department asserted Congress intended it to have jurisdiction over courts-martial.

But, that is hundreds of years away. In colonial times, the convening authority’s power was virtually absolute and he remained the only “appellate” authority in a court-martial. As you can probably imagine, this was abused, and Congress almost immediately stepped back in to require a bit more supervision.

More next time.

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[1] Then, and now, there existed multiple types of courts-martial, differentiated by the type of punishment it was authorized to impose. The more serious the authorized punishment, the higher rank the convening authority needed to be.

[2] In a separate post I might venture a little more into officer courts-martial. While there are some notable cases, mostly an officer was just as likely to demand a trial by court-martial when “dishonored” as he was to face a court-martial for misconduct. And even when that happened, officers were loathe to convict one of their own.

[3] Also in a separate post, I will explore a bit more why this was so. For now, recruiting was different, military organization was different, enlisted men were different. It was just a different time and a different people, and a different need.

Wading Into the Supreme Court’s Military Law Jurisprudence

“This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that ‘it is the primary business and armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.’”[1]

“We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or property. Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”[2]

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Landmark Case: United States v. Jacoby

United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74 (1951), held that service members are specifically excluded from the protections enshrined in the Constitution. Instead, they were solely entitled to the statutory rights granted them by Congress. These rights, referred to as “military due process,” may mirror those found in the Constitution, but they need not be. That all changed with the CAAF’s decision in United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428 (1960), which makes it a landmark—if not THE landmark—military justice decision.

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Another Look at the Supreme Court’s Military Justice Vagueness Doctrine

I previously explored the rule set down by the Supreme Court (“Court”) in Parker v. Levy[1] that “the proper standard of review for a vagueness challenge to the articles of the Code is the standard which applies to criminal statutes regulating economic affairs.”[2] After recently coming across some material on the level of scrutiny applied to criminal statutes regulating economic activity under the Commerce Clause in Article I of the Constitution of the United States, I dug a little deeper. And it surprised me.

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A Potential Working Definition of Military Common Law

One of the obstacles to researching military law is most of the scholarship occurred prior to the digitization of law journals. Many insightful articles are found by accident, buried in a footnote and inaccessible through research sites such as Westlaw and LexisNexis. One such article is CAPT Guy Zoghby’s 1965 article, Is There a Military Common Law of Crimes.[1] While he focuses on civilian offenses found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Zoghy does give us at least a starting definition of military common law.

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Understanding Military Intermediate Appellate Tribunals As Early Successes In, But Perhaps Now Left Behind By, Military Justice Reform

The debate over the appropriate role of the military commander in sexual assault cases remains a hotly contested issue among victim advocates, policymakers, and the military establishment. Listening to the rhetoric, one can excuse the interested reader for believing this is new—but it is not. Reformers both inside and outside the military have advocated for removing military commanders from military criminal law prosecutions for over 70 years.

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The Constitutionality of Military Jurisdiction: A Potential Starting Point

Now that my latest project on the continuing relevance of intermediate military tribunals is just about ready for submission this fall (just some proofreading and Bluebooking), I can spend a little more time musing about military law, history, and society. I have become increasingly interested in the history, and constitutionality, of military jurisdiction over service members, particularly in non-military specific offenses in the absence of a declared war. This led me to Sir William Blackstone’s monumental work on the common law.

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