My last post on the Supreme Court’s establishment of the service connection requirement in O’Callahan v. Parker ran long, so I concluded that post without discussing Solorio v. United States, the Supreme Court decision less than twenty years after O’Callahan that abandoned the service connection requirement and in its place adopted a “status” test. Regardless of the type of offense, where committed, or nexus to military service and mission, one’s status alone as a service member granted the military jurisdiction to prosecute. Before summarizing some of the similarities and differences between military and civilian prosecution in a subsequent post, in this post I discuss how the Rehnquist Court retreated from requiring the military to demonstrate a military nexus between the offense and military service in order to prosecute a service member within the military justice system.
In my last post, the first in a series looking at the legal history behind the ability of the American military to prosecute American citizens for civilian offenses committed within the United States during peacetime (absence of declaration of war), I summarized the evolution of statutes governing military criminal jurisdiction. This summary demonstrated, or at least took note of, the fact that for most of American history, the military retained limited jurisdiction to prosecute such offenses, if at all. In this post, I’d like to turn to the evolution of today’s legal landscape, as framed by the Supreme Court. This history tells us how we reached the point of one’s status as a military member, alone, subjected him or her to a criminal justice system that deprives him or her of substantial constitutional rights, even when facing prosecution for traditionally civilian offenses, within the United States, during time of peace when civilian courts are open for business.